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Abstract. Stokey (1979) showed in an intertemporal context that, under reasonable
assumptions, price discrimination is never optimal if a monopolist can pre-commit to a
price path. This note explores the implications of Stokey's result for the optimality of
inducing self-selection in the static quantity and quality contexts of Spence (1980) and
Mussa-Rosen (1978). It is shown that Stokey's result carries over to these other contexts
under appropriate curvature assumptions. Moreover, even under traditional curvature as-
sumptions, inducing self-selection may be suboptimal. Necessary and sufficient conditions
for discrimination to be optimal are derived for the two-type case.
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When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?
Stephen W. Salant
1. Introduction
Stokey (1979) considers the case of a monopolist selling in continuous time to het-
erogeneous consumers with unit demands. The seller can precommit to any price path.
By charging declining prices, the monopolist can induce customers with higher valuations
to purchase sooner than those with lower valuations. Although price discrimination by
inducing self-selection is, therefore, feasible in her model, Stokey shows that (under her
base-case assumptions) it is never optimal. The monopolist is better off precommitting to
a fixed price over time-thereby inducing everyone who would earn surplus at that price
to purchase at the first opportunity.
This is a striking result-and, in light of the related papers of Spence (1980) and
Mussa-Rosen (1978)-a puzzling one. Spence showed that it was optimal for a monopolist
to induce self-selection among heterogeneous customers by offering a menu of quanti-
ties, each requiring a different outlay. Mussa-Rosen showed in the quality context that
non-linear pricing to induce self-selection was likewise optimal. How can second-degree
price discrimination be optimal in these latter contexts but inevitably suboptimal in the
intertemporal one?
To facilitate a comparison of these models, we extract their essential features and
treat them in a common framework. Stokey's result that price discrimination-although
feasible-is never optimal is shown to have its counterpart in these other models if anal-
ogous curvature assumptions are made. While these are not the assumptions made by
Spence or Mussa-Rosen, Stokey's result nonetheless has important and unnuoticed impli-
cations for the contexts these authors considered.
Stokey's contributions were 1) to show that in the intertemporal case a corner solu-
tion inevitably arises and 2) to clarify its economic interpretation-that discrimination
Thanks to Mark Bagnoli and Joseph Swierzbinski for useful cornments.
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is suboptimal. Under the curvature assumptions of Spence and Mussa-Rosen, a corner
solution need not arise. But whenever it does, Stokey's point that discrimination is sub-
optimal remains valid. The note concludes by deriving necessary and sufficient conditions
for inducing self-selection to be optimal.
2. Stokey's Corner and Its Implications
It is instructive to cast Stokey's problem in a framework which facilitates comparison
with the work of Spence and Mussa-Rosen. This process of homogenization inevitably
omits some aspects of each model, but the omitted aspects are inessential for our purposes.
We begin with Mussa-Rosen's problem of quality choice when customers have unit de-
mands. We then define two transformations; using one, the static problem of Mussa-Rosen
becomes Stokey's continuous-time problem; using the other, their problem is transformed
into Spence's problem. For simplicity, we will assume that there are two types of buyers.
Let fJ denote the number of buyers of type i for i = 1,2. Assume each customer prefers
lower prices and higher quality but that the two types differ in their relative valuations
of these attributes. Let s denote quality and assume that U(s,i) = vis and v2 > vi.
Hence, the second type cares more about quality. Assume that the cost per unit output
to the monopolist of producing a good of quality s is c(s) and that c'(s) > 0-it is more
expensive to produce a good of higher quality. Assume the monopolist's quality choice is
nonnegative. Moreover, since we will be investigating corner cases and relating them to
Stokey's corner, let us assume that there is also an upper bound to the monopolist's quality
choice. Let s E [0,1]. Since the valuations and cost function can be re-scaled, normalizing
the upper bound in this way entails no loss of generality. To make the problem nontrivial,
assume c'(0) < v2; to make it tractable, assume c(0) = 0.
The monopolist can price-discriminate by offering a menu of goods of two qualities, si
and s2, priced appropriately. For any quality pair such that 32 > si, the monopolist can
obtain maxirnum profits by charging a price for si high enough to extract all the surplus
of the first type. This unavoidably leaves the second type the opportunity to get some
positive surplus by purchasing the good intended for the first type and puts an upper limit
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on how much can be charged for the higher quality (s2) good. Having priced each quality
good to extract maximum profits, the monopolist need merely select the two qualities
optimally:
maxlH = f 1 v 1 s 1 + f 2 [v 2 s2 - (v2 - vi)s 1J - fic(si) - f 2 c(s 2 ).
11,82
To transform Mussa-Rosen's problem into Stokey's problem, let si = e'rt. Since
si E [0,1], t; E [0, oo). Re-write the foregoing problem in terms of the new decision
variable, t;.
maxIl = fivie~t + f 2 [v 2 e-t2 - (v2 - vi)e~rt] fic(e~ti) - f 2 c(ert2).
t1,22
Since t; is a monotonic function of si, the problem is unchanged. But notice that if we
interpret ti as the date when the good is delivered and r as the force of interest we have
the objective function of a monopolist who can precommit to delivery dates i, (i = 1,2),
prices in continuous time, and sells to two types of consumers: Stokey's problem (with two
types rather than a continuum).
If the monopolist charges a discounted price of vie-'' for delivery at ti and a dis-
counted price of V2~''t2 - (v2 - vi)e-' t ' for delivery at t2 < ti, then the type-one individ-
ual will be indifferent between not participating and purchasing at ti while the type-two
individual will be indifferent between the two offerings. The undiscounted cost to the mo-
nopolist of producing one unit of the good of quality i is ertc(e-rt*). For future reference,
denote this undiscounted cost as k(t).
To transform Mussa-Rosen's problem into Spence's problem, let xi = c(si). Then
s; = c-1(z;). Denote this inverse function as U(z;). 1 Since si E [0,1], x E [0, c(1)J. Since
there is a monotonic relationship between s; and z;, we can again re-write the original
problem in terms of the new decision variable, zi:
.max 11= fiv1U(zi) + f2 [v2 U(x2 ) - (v2 - vi)U(zi)] - (fizi + f2z2 ).
' This second transformation is discussed in Tirole (1986), p.37 of chapter 3.
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In this version, xi is interpreted as the quantity of the i*" offerring. This is Spence's
problem of a monopolist with constant marginal costs (scaled to unity) facing two types
of consumers. Their utility functions have the form w(xi, i) = v;U(xz) for i = 1,2.
Stokey assumed that the undiscounted cost of producing a good and delivering it at
t1 is a constant: k(ti) = c. Hence, the problem she considered is linear in e'ti and must
achieve its maximum at a corner. The equivalent assumption in Mussa-Rosen would be
c(sg) = cs; and in Spence U(xz) = Ux.
Had these functions been assumed linear, the respective maximization problems would
have been linear and the optimum would inevitably have occurred at a corner as in the
intertemporal case. Consider, for example, Mussa-Rosen's version of the problem. Differ-
entiating the objective function, we obtain:
dir





v 1 - (2- V) - c'(1) ; 0,
then si = 1; otherwise si = 0. In either event, s2 = 1. In short, the monopolist either
provides the highest quality output to both types (and hence must charge the identical
price for the two offerings) or he provides that quality only to the second type and does not
serve the first type (the plausible interpretation of s = 0). Price discrimination is never
optimal if the cost function is linear.
This proposition clearly generalizes for any finite number of types. Facing n-types, the
full problem of the monopolist is to select nz price-quality pairs to:
max f;(p; - c(sg)) = max max fi(p 1 - c(s;))
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subject to s; 0,
Pi 0,
1-si >0,
visi - pi 0,
Vi si - pi - (vi sg- pg) > 0, for l'= 1, ... , n and j i.
Most authors "max out" the prices as a preliminary step since this inner maximization
problem is always linear and easy to solve.2 What remains in the two-type case is the
familiar problem analyzed above.
In principle, one might examine the full problem directly but this is rarely instructive.
The one exception is when c(-) is linear. In that case, the foregoing is a simple linear-
programming problem and achieves its maximum at s; = 0 or si = 1 for i = 1,... ,n.
Suppose si = s3 = 1 for i # j. Then the monopolist must charge the same prices (pi = pj)
or the customer-type charged the higher price would prefer the other's offerring-and
the final constraint would be violated. Hence, price discrimination is never optimal in
the n-type case if c(-) is linear. Given the transformations defined above, the analogous
proposition holds for the quantity and temporal interpretations.
3. Extension to the Non-linear Case
Even when the monopolist's cost function (resp. consumers' utility function) is strictly
convex (resp. strictly concave), a corner solution might still result. To conclude the
analysis, therefore, we re-examine the quality-choice model above and derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for price discrimination to be optimal. These conditions are
then transformed for use in the intertemporal and quantity interpretations of the model.
Although the approach generalizes, we confine ourselves in this section to an analysis of
the two-type case; the general case is tedious and uninstructive.
Assume in the quality model that the cost function is at least weakly convex. Then
any solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is optimal. There are in principle five classes
2 It is always optimal to set sit > ai anid pg = u~g- s;_.1 (vg - v.;_1 ) - .. . - suz- v1). For details,
see Spence,[1980, p.823].
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of programs in which no price discrimination occurs: when both types of customers are
provided the identical quality goods at an interior point or at one of the two boundaries
and when one of the two types is served but not the other. Hence if the optimal program
(si, s2) has any of the following five characteristics, then price discrimination is suboptimal:
(1) si = s2 = s E (0,1); (2) si = s2 = 0; (3) si > 0 and s2 = 0; (4) si =s2 = 1; and (5)
si = 0 and s2 > 0. Assumptions which insure that none of these cases arises insure that
price discrimination is optimal.
For (1) to occur, c'(s) = v2 = vi - [f 2/fi](v 2 - vi), contradicting the assumption
that V2 - v1 > 0. For (2) or (3) to occur, s2 = 0 and v2 - c'(0) < 0, contradicting
v2 - c'(0) > 0. Hence if price discrimination is suboptimal then either si = s2 = 1 or
si = 0 and s2 > 0. The following condition is sufficient to rule out both possibilities:
c'(0) <v 1 - [f 2/fi](v 2 - v1) < c'(1). Moreover, given the concavity of the problem if price
discrimination is optimal this condition must hold.
It is straightforward to translate this condition to the other contexts. In Stokey's
version of the problem, recall that k(t) = ertc(e-rt). This implies that c'(1) = k(0) -k' (0)/r
and c'(0) = limt. ,{k(t) - k'(t)/r}. These terms can be substituted into the condition to
restate it in terms of k(.).
Similarly, in Spence's version recall that c-1(x) = s = U(x). In this version, x is
interpreted as quantity. When s = 0, x = c(0) = 0; when s = 1, x = c(1). Since
c-'(x) = U(x), c'(0) = 1/c'-(0) =1/U'(0) and c'(1) = 1/c'-1((1)) = 1/U'((1)). These
terms can be substituted into the condition to restate it in terms of U(-). The condition
not only implies that price discrimination will be suboptimal if c(-), k(.) or U(-) is linear
but also characterizes when discrimination is optimal if any of these functions is strictly
convex (resp. strictly concave).
Analogous conditions can be derived for the n-type although they are more cumber-
some. If price discrimination is suboptimal, those consumers who are served must purchase
the same offering (and hence will pay the same price). Assumptions insuring that none of
the complementary slackness conditions for such corner solutions holds insure that price
discrimination is optimal. If the monopolist's optimization problem is quasi-concave, then
these conditions are also necessary for price discrimination to be optimal.
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4. Conclusion
This note has pointed out the implications of Stokey's (1979) article on intertemporal
price discrimination for the optimality in other contexts of inducing self-selection. If I were
to speculate on why these implications have not been drawn previously, two reasons suggest
themselves: 1) Stokey did not emphasize the relation of her problem tQ the literature on
static self-selection problems; and 2) her assumption that the monopolist could precommit
to a price path has lessened readership in this era of subgame-perfection.
Although a principal contribution of Stokey's (1979) analysis is its far-reaching impli-
cations for the optimality of second-degree price-discrimination, it should be pointed out
that her analysis is relevant to at least some real-world situations of interest. Many busi-
nesses (delivery services such as Federal Express or United Parcel Service) charge different
prices for delivery at different subsequent dates. By charging customers when the contract
is signed rather than when delivery occurs, such sellers routinely induce self-selection of the
kind which Stokey's monopolist considers. Of course, such services need to make credible
their promises to deliver the package on time. They often accomplish this by contractually
obligating themselves to pay a refund if delivery is late.
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